

**Nationality and Sovereignty
in the New World Order**

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ABSTRACT

Nationality and sovereignty in a global economy have become conflicted and contested principles. The control of territory and population, which classically was the basis of sovereignty, is eroding in transnational flows of capital, labor, products, and ideas. Given how rapidly cyberspaces are forming from the fusion of computers with wired and wireless telecommunication networks all over the world, we need to investigate the political, economic and social questions being raised by this process. Cyberspace is not a notion about things to come; it marks the material condition of things at work today. It is now important to ask how, why, and where cyberspaces are transforming the everyday life of contemporary economies, societies and states. But the best way to do this is to illuminate first how the terms of nationality and sovereignty are shifting in the present New World Order.

O. After Governmentality

Our world's geopolitical architecture has changed immensely since 1989. Yet, there is no clear understanding about how it changed so quickly or so radically in so little time. New information technologies are a large part of it, the flexible specialization of manufacturing is another big piece, the time-space compression of fast capitalism also cannot be ignored (Agger, 1989). In any event, old languages cultivated in past circumstances now are inadequate for interpreting this new era, forcing us to play with new terms capable of disclosing fresh insights from the unfixed terrain of today's political geography.

Since the emergence of modern capitalism and the territorial nation-state in Western Europe several centuries ago, as Foucault (1991) observes, centered systems of government have organized territorialized regimes with sovereign authority around particular discursive-and-coercive techniques for disciplining space, populations and individuals to create a new "modern" system of production and consumption. Sovereign authorities created their powers by artfully combining space, people and resources in territorialized containments, keeping outsiders away as they extracted what they could from insiders. Sovereign national governments run upon governmentality, or techniques for forging "a level of reality, a field of intervention, through a series of complex processes" in which "government is the right disposition of things" arranged by state regimes to serve

"convenient ends" (Foucault, 1991: 93). These processes evolved in new state formations, operating as "a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security" (Foucault, 1991: 102).

For those who are devoted watchers of CNN International or BBC World, however, the day's news indicates how thoroughly these routines of governmentality are now in crisis. The right disposition of things is not happening, and many inconveniences displace what once were settled convenient ends. Moreover, the dissolution of territoriality and degradation of sovereignty are not merely confined to wild zones in Africa or the former Soviet Union. Parallels turn up in many other places. India, Pakistan, Canada, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Italy, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Haiti, Mexico, to mention only a few, all have similar disciplinary breakdowns bubbling up within their nominally "territorial expanses" as they have been bordered by their putatively "sovereign authorities" (Kaplan, 1994).

Even "the United States" of America finds new chaotic presences waffling its formal territoriality and warping its substantive sovereignty. Sony, Toyota, and Sumitomo exert strong controlling influences over many American household, urban and mercantile spaces; Japanese capitalists have conquered Hawaii financially in the 1980s in ways that Japanese militarists during the 1940s could only dream. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms, the International Revenue Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Drug Enforcement Agency increasingly operate, like dictatorial Ministries of Internal Security, all across the nation, declaring open hostilities as paramilitary war machines against many members of the body politic that do not acknowledge their supreme power on backwoods Idaho cabins, remote Montana ranches, in Texan fundamentalist communes, at Florida airstrips, or along California's borders with Mexico. These coercive maneuvers, in turn, spark many new contragovernmental resistances from the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombers to the Unabomber anarchist to the Michigan militias. In the meantime, mafia potentates in New York, Asian crime gangs, Jamaican posses, Haitian toughs, Colombian drug lords, and Nigerian syndicates all are exercising extraordinary levels of quasi-legitimate coercive and commercial power in hundreds of housing projects, poor neighborhoods, and city halls all over the United States--those who dissent against them can be tortured, those who oppose them are murdered, those who accept them are exploited, those who openly embrace them can be served. Consequently, everyday politics in many places appears to become what power games always were without a pretext of legitimate governmentalizing authority: the conduct of war, crime, and exploitation by other means.

1. Realist Writing/Wrighting Realities

During the long twilight struggle of the Cold War, many

things about nationality and sovereignty seemed fairly clear, even though they never truly were. In the conceptual condominiums erected upon the landfill of ideological confrontation after World War II, national policymakers, power pundits, and academic analysts could look outside the windows of their respective quarters and see very clear conflicts, definite interests, obvious alliances. The deep geopolitical quakes of 1989-1991, however, toppled all of these neat arrangements, leaving everyone in the dark groping through the wreckage for new categories to interpret the New World Disorder spilling out of the Old Cold War Order. Sitting through the aftershocks now, one hears many voices under the rubble: one says "the end of Nature" (McKibben, 1989), another cries "the end of History" (Fukuyama, 1992), one more mutters "the West versus the rest" (Huntington, 1993). Furious sounds of frantic digging, however, now gives us only some comfort as the search teams appear intent upon disinterring the ancient certainties and timeless truths of political realism (Krasner, 1992) to rescue us from the chaos of the present era.

Sadly, the political realists cling to what may now be realistic phantasms, like political and epistemological realism, to cope with a world that is no longer quite captured completely by their reified reductionistic categories. Modern political realism assumes a regimen of national/statal governmentality, operating smoothly in territorial nation-states (Kennedy, 1992).

These states have hardened borders, inviolate territorial spaces, and defensible centers in an international order of all other comparable states all of which are dedicated to maintaining territorial control over their sovereign spaces, resisting outside threats to their borders, and containing internal challenges to their political autonomy. Operating in these conditions calls for simple but consistent strategies: "Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy. A foreign policy based on this image is neither moral nor immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us" (Waltz, 1959: 238).

Responding rationally to the world about us, according to political realism, requires that we also embrace an epistemological realism foreshadowed by political realism's premise of objectifiable laws governing human nature (Bhaskar, 1989; Sayer, 1989). Political realists assume there are objective categories with universal validity framing political interests, normative laws and empirical regularities dividing the realms of value and fact, and, finally, stable expectations of an autonomous political reason divorcing calculations of state power from issues of legality or morality. Epistemological realism, assures them that there are constant regularities embedded in

what they regard as objective reality, and human observation can identify these patterns and structures in conventional categories for others to accept. Consequently, as Krasner concludes, political realism provides vital insights into state operations for an international politics. That is,

It is an effort to explain both the behavior of individual states and the characteristics of international system as a whole. The ontological given for realism is that sovereign states are the constitutive components of the international system. Sovereignty is a political order based on territorial control. The international system is anarchical. It is a self-help system. There is no higher authority that can constrain or channel the behavior of states. Sovereign states are rational self-seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical environment in which their security and well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilize their own resources against external threats (1992: 39).

These categories, however, convey a sense of characters, conflicts, and concepts that may no longer have the same resonance on the world stage.

Any resonance in their reasoning depends upon an orthodox obedience to codes of governmentality which confuse centered state sovereignty with stable governmentalization programs and secure national territoriality with disciplinary spaces. The political order, self-help and territorial control of realist sovereignty emerge as an ontological given in the modern era, because a powerful combination of national states and international markets has given modern society an ontology rooted in autonomous ruling regimes that "bring life and its mechanisms

into the realm of explicit calculations" as part of any modern government's many "transformations of human life" (Foucault, 1980: 143). State rule explicitly calculates a disciplinary realm for "life" (its subjects and citizens) and "its mechanisms" (ethos, economy, ecology) in controlled territorial containers. Containment in space by power constitutes sovereignty and territoriality as governmentality. As Foucault argues, territory "is the very foundation of principality and sovereignty" (1991: 93).

All territorialized formations of national governmentality, however, are also "an imagined political community--and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991: 6). On one level, acquiring nomological "powers of speech" among one people or ethnonational group begins the constitution, on another level, of a centered, single country, or one territorial "jurisdiction" (more literally, here, a form of lawful speech, a center of legal diction, or a mode of speaking nomologically), for, but also "over," the diverse array of peoples inhabiting the spaces where this lawful speech carries (Gellner, 1983). Such powers transform many places on many terrains into one zone of continuous jurisdicative governmentality, spatializing the power of making rules in this territory materially, organizationally and symbolically as its rule-making realm of sovereignty. At the margins of sub-national and super-national spaces, national codes of lawful speech establish borders where power constantly

reconstructs its territorial containments (Helgerson, 1992). Autonomous spaces--nation-states--are places where autonomous powers get to name the games that define and delimit their rules, making them the rulers. Through these tactics, then, statalizing power reworks the ground, divides up its resources, and commands economic production to materialize its rules against other powers, fixing its external sovereignty in a regime of governmentality. Rousseau captures the quality of these dynamics in governmentality quite aptly when he observes that the institution of state power "is devoted solely to two objects: to extend their rule beyond their frontiers and to make it more absolute within them. Any other purpose they may have is subservient to one of these aims, or merely a pretext for attaining them" (1917: 95).

Within nominally sovereign territories today, however, new flows of communication and information are decentering once sovereign authorities, multiplying operational spaces, dividing ties of belongingness, and mixing zones of rules. These flows provide new alternative codes of contragovernmental legitimacy, desire and power over new populations in many places to operate against "old sovereignties." Instead of the imagined community being "a nation of the people," one sees the reimagination and redistribution of things around convenient ends determined not by the geographical state, but rather for the engaged cybernetic faithful, by the global market, which are emerging as unfixed

multidirectional flows colliding against fixed "sovereign" rule.

The facts of sovereignty and territoriality as described by international law, then are becoming transnational legalistic fictions. As the proliferating sub/supranational nuclei of decentralized power now author(ize) contragovernmentalistic law-making and law-breaking within uncertain territories, each sovereign finds itself on its own territory constantly challenged from within and without by divisive fluidized nuclear fissions, like ethnic tribalism, criminal gangsterism, or linguistic separatism, or integrative fluidized nuclear fusions, like religious fundamentalism, pan-national racialism, or global environmentalism, crosscutting their statalized populations and places.

Political realism, then, faces state-splintering movements in all of its cultural, economic, and organizational zones. As wars over political correctness, nationalized industry, or overblown bureaucracy struggle over reducing big government(ality) in favor of advancing small (contra)government(ality), Krasner's basic realist assumptions about an "inter-national system as a whole" shatter.

International anarchy is being displaced by global heterarchies.

This isotopic degradation of stable nation-states generates many unstable post statal heterotopes--each one with its own fractalized spaces and populations. Thus, in terms of nationalized state culture, "the West is living through an

explosive situation, not only with regard to other cultural universes (such as the 'third world'), but internally as well, as an apparently irresistible pluralization renders an unilinear view of the world and history impossible" (Vattimo, 1992: 6). In terms of global economic changes, "barriers to cross-border flows of knowledge, money, and tangible products are crumbling; groups of people in every nation are joining global webs" (1991: 172). And, in terms of bureaucratic systems, rule by juridical sovereignty is displaced by rules of operational performativity, "that is," as Lyotard claims, organizing everything around "the best possible input/output equation" (1984: 46). Statal rules of legal order are decentered as the shifts toward the performative provide new criteria for determining what is strong, what is just, and what is true in the operational workings of informational flows--racial myth, God terms, ethnic belief, gang interests, cultic loyalties, faith community, or environmental concerns all set their pluralizing forms of ordering people and things in multiple spaces against those of secular territorialized nationalism. The normativity of laws in statist jurisdictions, then, gradually is being undercut by the performativity of extra-statist contradictions that often also are post-jurisdictional (Lyotard, 1984: 46).

In the global flows of informational capitalism, contragovernmentalities create a world of generalized communication, which "explodes like a multiplicity of 'local'

rationalities--ethnic, sexual, religious, cultural, or aesthetic minorities--that finally speak up for themselves. They are no longer repressed and cowed into silence by the idea of a single true form of humanity that must be realized irrespective of particularity and individual finitude, transience, and contingency" (Vattimo, 1992: 9). Emancipation in the current deterritorialized disorder, "consists in disorientation, which is at the same time also the liberation of differences, of local elements, of what generally could be called dialect" (Vattimo, 1992: 8). Through the multiplicity of dialects and their different cultural universes, living in this unstable, pluralistic world "means to experience freedom as a continual oscillation between belonging and disorientation" (Vattimo, 1992: 10) in many contragovernmentalities.

From the urban cocaine culture, Internet listserve links, radical Islamic fundamentalism to rural ecoterrorist cells, CNN Headline News, illegal Asian workers, one finds spaces and populations that now are "un-stated" as contragovernmental influences rather than "in-stated" as governmentalities. Such unreal/surreal/hyperreal estates provide new centers, multiple margins, and parallel channels where flows of power have fresh options to test alternative agendas, interests, and values beyond, beside, and beneath those of the nation-state. While these eruptions are happening globally, they are not creating either a stable economy or a homogeneous society around the world

(Henderson and Castells, 1987). Instead these decentering contragovernmentalities reconfirm Marx's analysis of capitalist modernity: "all that is solid melts into air."

In cyberspace, for example, one accepts new forms of dominion simply in order to conduct one's business there. Embedding one's cybersubjectivity in one operating system or network application means that you must migrate into those spaces, and out of many previously existing loyalties to other ways of doing things. Yet, this move fractures our zones of action and discourse; it empowers system operators to police, upgrade, and develop our operating systems, and it directs appliers of networking to cyberscape our individual and collective sense of space beyond, behind, and beneath the registers of national sovereign territoriality. One becomes the captive of particular hardware platforms, the denizen of specific netscapes, or the partisan of dedicated applications in the multiple domains of cyberspace. Proprietary codes now capture and contain "on-line" what once was autonomous cultural activity "off-line."

Territories are no longer realistic Euclidean solids or planes in a world of cyberspace (Luke, 1993). Instead, they surrealistically branch into fractal nets, webbing out into many un-stated autonomous spheres of fluid power-exertion where sovereigns cannot determine for themselves what laws will be, for whom, and why. Sovereign territorial power allegedly produces

its effects on individuals and collectives in simple-singular spaces that are seen as rigid and continuous. Undistorted by contradictive counterinfluences or subversive uncontrolled activities, sovereign self-rule supposedly is ruling over its own singular space in accord with realism's autonomy of the political. Territory appears now, however, to be contested. It too becomes a pluralized space that is complex, flexible, and discontinuous. Obviously, these changes raise even bigger issues of identity, community, and nationality (Jameson, 1991). Territoriality is intimately entwined with defining who a person is politically, what a community is culturally, and where a nation is socially. A netcentric world is a nation-decentered world in which intensely-felt community ties can and will form around interests articulated at web sites rather than geographic sites. Will CyberNewZealand exist, and can it compete with CyberJapan, CyberAmerica, or CyberBritain? "Who is us?" becomes a major question of personal/group identity in a world where webcrawling in cyberspace begins to displace nationalistic civil rituals as a means of self-understanding. Certainly, the anglocentricity of operating systems, the technoscientificity of network, and the hardware constraints of access all guarantee that many of today's existing systems of privilege and prejudice will continue to be found in these cyberspaces. But, will they work in the same ways through the same spaces? A prospect for new cultural imperialisms, but now all the way down to the level

of wired/wireless telecom networks, operating system chauvinisms, or information service disutilities, crops up immediately for anyone advocating the proliferation of cyberspaces.

Porting people into cyberspace may work well on one level, but as these spaces unfold one sees them exerting new corrosive pressures on prevailing systems of political community, economic autonomy, and cultural identity. Such issues may not seem apparent in cyberspace at first glance, but a thorough-going evaluation of their possibilities must face the implications of (de)porting people into cyberspaces as a means of training political subjects anywhere anytime anyway in a netcentric world, because it also means that one trans-ports them from interactions conducted real space. As the cyberporn shutdown of CompuServe in Germany illustrates, does CyberNewZealand want CyberNewZealanders webcrawling around elsewhere, and how will it control or code what they do, see or hear when they are speeding through foreign-based servers? Likewise, who does CyberNewZealand want browsing cyberspatially in its domains, and how will it train its own citizens to cope with such co-operators within this CyberNation?

In any given national territory, for example, one will find large corporate entities, occupying demographic markets and turning sales territories into value-added regions of personal security, social stability, and cultural identity via the cash nexus. The more businesses collocate in political territories, the more multipolarized these sovereign spaces become, preempting

public space with private places or corporate clientages. Now, like democratic citizens as behaving as shoppers in an enclosed mall, otherwise autonomous populations are subject to private powers, subordinate to the agendas of capital, and dominated by the choices provided by the markets. And, "the global reach" (Barnet and Mueller, 1974) of many businesses pulls people and states in contradictory directions: oil companies, media concerns, food businesses, housing builders, electronics giants each seek to limit individual and collective freedoms to suit their convenient ends in each respective firm's products and plans. The social spaces surrounding telephone service, software applications, gasoline burning, television buying, automobile travel, detergent use or electricity connections are controlled and coordinated by corporate power, creating subnational and transnational collective interests in global corporate ecologies. The functional pluralization of territorialized political spaces in this way, then, permits AT&T, Exxon, Toshiba, Nissan, Unilever, or Phillips to colonize the same populations at the same time in many places through pluralizing different moments of the everyday life (Taylor and Thrift, 1986).

And, it does not end with business and markets. Instead of a centered sovereignty, one sees unstated flows--decentered power centers, illegitimate law-making bodies, unruly rule-setting agencies. Algerian Islamic radicals, Russian army generals, Chechen mafia bosses, Angolan UNITA leaders, or Burmese

narcocapitalist strongmen immediately all come to mind as such fluid powers. Everyone knows they exist as potentates, but one cannot fix their identities without distinguishing their zones of operation in terrorist undergrounds, Swiss banks, black markets, international organizations, or underworld wars from territorial sovereignty. As little fissionable nuclei, they constantly pass in and out of spaces that states do not control, beyond the rules of rulers, over and around the writs of written law. Emerging hand-in-hand with the centralized nuclear power of strategic zone-regimes during the Cold War, these decentralized power nuclei set the rules within their particular domains of space, regions of operation, or communities of meaning where the rulings of governmentalizing states are ineffective, illegitimate, or powerless. If one seeks observables to track the phenomenologies of governmentality and contragovernmentality, then do not look for political realism's jurisdictions. Hunt instead for contradictive agencies and structures, burrowing their contragovernmentalizing means of siting contragovernmentalized authority over their postnational/antistatal areas of performative operation--local, specific, discrete, and diffuse--beneath, behind or between the national jurisdictions that political geography ordinarily maps (Reich, 1991; Soja, 1989).

Un-stated zones open spaces where fluid contragovernmentality resists and retards the governmentality of state sovereignty. One sees other groups, agencies, individuals

or entities in these flows aspiring to exercise direction not as in-stated sovereigns who actually reign over all as autonomous rulers, but rather as rule-setting, rule-applying, and rule-interpreting heteronymous forces running through more narrowly focused, localized, or zoned areas of operation where flows of ideas, money and power un-state, disap-point, and de-center in-stated power (Corbridge, Martin, and Thrift: 1994). Columbia, for example, is perhaps a nation-state of coffee plantations run from Bogota; but, it also is a combine of narcocapitalist postnational/antistatal potentates, running in and out of Cali, Medellin and the coca farms. In the wild zones of Angola, Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, or Bolivia, the sovereignty imputed to authorities sitting in capital buildings emplaced on nominally national territories is eclipsed by more fluid, enterprising potentates, like UNITA, Serbian irregulars, the Khmer Rouge, and Andean drug lords, all devoted to setting the rules in their growing zones of unstated operation (Luke, 1994). As Bodin notes, once flows start having "the arms and the fortresses in their power," these potentates do have truly extraordinary authority inasmuch as "the master of brute force is, or can be, the master of men, of the laws, and of the entire commonwealth" (1992: 108).

Will travelling to cyberspaces prepare citizens for coping with a New World Order built out of an "Information Age" society? Perhaps not, but maybe yes? After all, what is an Information

Age society? Is it secure employment in virtual factories and firms via telecommuting? Is it perpetual underemployment for workers subcontracting out to flexibly specialized hollow corporations as "permanent temporaries?" Is it coping with unemployment in low-wage, low-skill jobs centered upon data entry, word processing, boilerplate code writing? Obviously, it can be all of these alternatives, depending on what one's nationality, race, class, gender, age, or income are (Luke, 1989). Cyberspace may prepare students for coping with such environments, but, at the same time, cyberspaces may parallel the larger inequalities of Information Age societies as they train the informationally competent elite, which makes up "the symbolic analysts" or "successful fifth" of any informational system, how to manage the affairs of the "failed four-fifths" or informationally obsolete who get left behind. In fact, all inhabitants in cyberspace may even get some serious exposure to the new material inequalities of an informational order--slow operating systems, restricted bandwidth, limited memory, narrow net access, inaccessible data bases, crude websites.

To conclude, old concepts, like political realism, sovereign territoriality, Cold War are highly contestable: the meanings of all these terms amidst a world of global flows are unstable, variable, and unfixed. Old in-stated forms of governmentality, sovereignty and territoriality after the Cold War are being reconstituted in the un-stated spaces of contragovernmentality,

unstable flows and post-territoriality within a New World Order.

Flows may provide their own securities of place, models for behavior, and circuits of value that materially can frame individual thought and group action globally and locally. Contragovernmentalizing flows juxtapose new placements of economic, cultural, and social action within local networks of subnational, national, and supranational practices from which individuals and communities will fabricate their shared personal identities and social spaces as individuals and populations in global formations far beyond the old triangles of sovereignty-discipline-government naively assumed to still exist as they supposedly always have by political realists.

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